The number of free trade agreements has increased substantially since 1980 despite efforts to promote multilateral trade liberalization. While there is evidence on the determinants of FTA formation, still little is known on the processing of trade agreements, particularly regarding the pre-implementation duration. This paper fills the research gap by using event data on the proposal, the negotiation, the signing, and the implementation of trade agreements. Duration analysis is employed to examine the connection between regime types and the lengths of the negotiation and the ratification stages. The results support the claim that higher levels of democratization and political constraints are associated with delays in the implementation of an agreement. This is primarily observable in the ratification stage. Moreover, I detect significantly prolonged negotiation talks and ratifications if the European Union participates.
Introduction
Despite the World Trade Organization's (WTO) effort to promote multilateral trade liberalization, there has been a surge in bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) instead. Consequently, the proliferation of these agreements encouraged the WTO to frame FTAs in terms of coherence instead of co-existence (WTO, 2011) . While we have an course of trade liberalization by focusing on innovation activities that determine the decision to export and the trade volume prior trade liberalization. In a similar vein, Bergin and Lin (2012) empirically show that trade increments are triggered well ahead of the implementation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). In both papers, the authors refer to firm behavior as the leading driver to a trade increase, mainly triggered by a shift in expectations with respect to future profits in the foreign market. In this context, policy uncertainty is an issue in international economics that deserves more attention as it adds a new perspective to the interaction between the private sector and the policy level. Handley and Limão (2012) contribute to this debate by assessing Portugal's accession to the European Union (EU). Even though trade barriers were lifted well ahead of the formal accession the EU, trade creating effects only emerged after Portugal officially joined the bloc. 4 The contribution of this paper lies in the documentation of determinants of the duration of trade negotiations, as well as the ratification stage, with a special focus on driving factors from the political spectrum. The results allow a better evaluation of the announcements of trade initiatives and thereby may help to reduce uncertainty involved in the interaction between firms and policymakers. Using a dataset with time-varying covariates, the determinants of the duration of FTA negotiations are found to be multi-dimensional, and not limited to economic factors. Political aspects, especially the levels of democratization and political constraints, are equally important. Existing literature does not address this dimension.
My findings suggest that bilateral trade agreements reflect significant faster negotiation processes as compared to agreements with more than two countries involved, even though this effect diminishes in the ratification stage -between signature of the agreement and enforcement of the liberalization measures. The same effect on the negotiation process is observed for countries that are more reliant on international trade. Further, countries that are members of the EU mirror significant delays that, as I will argue, may be based on additional provisions during negotiations (e.g. WTO-X) and coordination issues. I find support for the claim that political regime types play a major role in determining the implementation process: delays between signature and implementation are more likely if countries have more democratic political systems, even though this effect points in the opposite direction during the negotiation stage. A prolonging influence is observed during ratification for a higher level of political constraints for the executive power within a country, which is consistent with the (scarce) literature on this topic. The implications for policy from this research are manifold: First, if the fast finalization of trade negotiations with a single trading partner is a priority, countries should seek a bilateral agreement instead of a multilateral one. Second, democracy and the respective level of political constraints come at a cost: they are associated with longer ratification periods. Third: negotiation partners should be more patient between any stages of the implementation process if the EU takes part in the prospective FTA, as its participation indicates a lower probability of quickly closing trade deal. This may be due to attached WTO-X provisions in the negotiation stage as well as to the EU coordination process.
The paper is structured as follows: The following section reviews the respective literature on international trade and cooperation, while section three describes potential determinants for longer/shorter negotiation and implementation periods. The data and the econometric specifications are described in sections four and five respectively. Section six presents the results on the duration of the negotiation and ratification processes. Section seven concludes.
Existing literature
The objective of this section is to motivate the analysis of the negotiation and ratification durations with the recent work on transition dynamics of FTAs. The results of the majority of papers on the trade creating effects of FTAs lead to the conclusion that trade is triggered by the implementation of an agreement. 5 While the literature on the ex-post trade effects of FTAs is exhaustive, there is substantial room for contributions that aim at investigating the accompanying effects of trade agreements. In this section I first give an overview on the discussion about anticipatory trade effects of FTAs. Since firms may only be induced to export prior to the actual lifting of trade barriers, given that the announcement of a common 5 Examples include Frankel (1997) and Glick and Rose (2002) .
FTA is credible, we want to know what factors can lead firms to expect a slow or fast transition period between announcement and implementation. I then summarize the relevant body of literature that deals with duration analysis in the context of international treaties.
Since Freund and McLaren (1999) pointed out anticipatory effects of trade agreements, the notion of pre-implementation effects has been included in successive analyses. According to their results, trade adjustment led to anticipatory trade effects four years before countries officially joined the EU. Other contributions to the literature seem to affirm the presence of anticipatory trade effects of trade agreements. Results by Magee (2008) show that there is substantial anticipation prior to an agreement's implementation, if controlled for leads in a gravity model analysis. In a similar vein, Mölders and Volz (2011) analyze preimplementation effects from a different angle by focusing on the consecutive stages of implementation that an FTA runs through. Their results point toward the existence of anticipatory trade effects in the context of East Asian bilateral FTAs during the negotiation stage of an FTA. Burstein and Melitz (2011) shed light into the transition dynamics of firms during trade liberalization. In their model, exporting decisions are driven by productivity dynamics. 6 Since sunk costs, associated with the exporting decision, generate an option value of waiting, some firms may find it profitable to begin exporting after the announcement of future trade liberalization. 7 Bergin and Lin (2012) make use of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) in order to identify pre-implementation trade effects for countries joining the EMU. Similar to Burstein and Melitz (2011) , their results are based on the forward-looking behavior of firms reacting to news about future trade liberalization. The fact that the mere announcement of trade liberalization may not suffice to generate anticipatory trade effects can be pinned down to the credibility of such an announcement. Firms will only invest in the new trade opportunity if they expect the sunk costs to flow back in future revenues. Handley and Limão (2012) examines Portugal's accession to the EU. Prior to its formal inclusion into the trade bloc, trade preferences were already at the free-trade level for industrial goods.
However, there was a substantial increase in trade flows after the accession was formally concluded. This stresses the importance of formal trade agreements for increasing credibility and exploiting the full scope of the trade potential.
With respect to the impact of regime types on cooperation at the country level, Mansfield et al. (2002) Milner also analyze empirically the role of the number of veto players on delays during the ratification stage. In accordance to their model and the findings presented here, a greater number of veto players will make it more likely for ratification to be delayed.
The findings by Moser and Rose (2012) mirror the paper presented here in many respects, as the authors investigate the driving factors of the duration between the announcement of negotiations and the signing of the agreement. The authors focus on the economic determinants, thereby excluding potential driving forces from the political dimension. When it comes to the comparability of the results, I also find evidence for shorter durations due to fewer negotiation partners. In particular, bilateral FTAs are implemented significantly faster than multilateral counterparts. The paper by Baccini (forthcoming) focuses on the propensity of country-pairs to cooperate in a trade agreement as well as the length of the respective negotiation period for the case of North-South preferential trade agreements. The role of the level of countries' institutions is at the center of Baccini and these are analyzed with the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. His findings suggest that a higher level of institutional quality is associated with shorter negotiation durations, aside from a higher probability of the formation of trade agreements. Simonelli (2011) investigates the determinants of the duration of the negotiation process of international multilateral agreements; limited to agreements on rules of war, arms control, terrorism, commodities and environment issues. She thereby excludes the sort of agreement that is the focus of my paper. 8 The results show that as the number of countries increases, so does the length of the bargaining process, even though the number of participant countries should be quite large in order to reveal this impact. In contrast, Wong and Yu (2007) focus on the accession duration of potential member countries to the GATT/WTO. In particular, the authors emphasize the role of a country's level of democratization. In accordance with the predictions of Mansfield et al. (2002) with respect to the higher probability of FTA formation, if countries are more democratic, Wong and Yu find a statistically significant effect (shorter accession duration) of the democracy variable. In a similar vein, Davis and Wilf (2011) examine the duration from a country's independence until the application date for the WTO, as well as the respective negotiation time form application until formal membership. The authors confirm a shorter time until application to the WTO if countries are more similar in their levels of democracy.
Similar to the approach taken in section six of the present paper, but with regard to bilateral investment treaties (BITs), Haftel and Thompson (forthcoming) estimate the effect of the level of democracy and the political constraints on the duration of the ratification period between signature of an international agreement and the domestic process until the agreement is implemented. The authors control for various political and legal constraints that may influence the duration and find empirical support for a duration-increasing effect of political constraints of the executive. A greater number of veto players in the ratification process will make the process take longer. Likewise, more democratic governments need more time to implement a signed agreement.
In the following section, I motivate potential determinants that, according to the literature on international cooperation or FTA formation, may affect the length of trade negotiations.
Theoretical considerations
The main objective of this paper is to uncover the potential driving factors behind the duration of an FTA's road to implementation, with special emphasis on the levels of democracy and political constraints. The bargaining model by Fearon (1998) Given that the present paper focuses on both the negotiation and ratification stages, it should be noted that I cannot expect the same determinants to exhibit the same influence on the respective durations. In the negotiation process, the policy interaction and opposing interest groups at the (between-) country level are central, whereas in the ratification stage, political constraints within each country gain influence. Even though between-country differences in the expected design of a future FTA are shaped by interests within each country, the decision-making process is expected to shift from the between-toward the within-country case if I move from negotiation to ratification (Mansfield and Milner, 2012: 57).
9 r denotes the discount rate.
In the following I give an overview on what factors may determine the duration of the negotiations and the time until successful implementation of trade agreements, given empirical and anecdotal evidence in the literature. The respective data sources for the following determinants can be found in the subsequent section.
Political determinants
In the literature, there is an abundance of papers on the effect of trade liberalization (e.g. via 
Level of democracy:
The more democratic a country, the more probable it is that it will form an FTA. Mansfield et al. (2002) (UNCTAD, 2003) . Trade agreements between the EU and developing countries further carry expectations regarding development policy and its impact (Makhan, 2010) .
also includes these kinds of provisions. 12 The inclusion of governance clearly adds a new dimension to the negotiation process that has the potential to increase the complexity and, hence, the time until implementation. In accordance with both Haftel and Thompson (forthcoming) and Wong and Yu (2007) 12 See Hafner-Burton (2009). 13 Another channel through which democracy may influence the implementation process of trade agreements is driven by electoral motives. Conconi et al. (2012) show that as elections come closer, legislators in the US tend to vote more protectionist.
Besides these hypotheses, which reflect the main research question of this paper, other determinants have the potential to drive both negotiation and ratification processes. In the following, I derive additional variables from the literature that are included in the empirical part of this paper.
FTA activity: Given that countries do not negotiate all of their trade agreements at the same point in time, the level of experience in FTA negotiations or the capacity for negotiating on trade issues with other countries, can be best approximated with the number of agreements in force for any given period. It may be expected that countries with more implemented
FTAs have better capacities for trade negotiations and the respective ratifications, thus reflecting fewer delays.
Bilateral vs. multilateral agreements:
Simonelli (2011) focuses on the number of negotiation partners at the bargaining table. Accordingly, as the number of states increases, so does the complexity involved in the process, e.g. due to the increasing number of items to negotiate over. 14 A distinction between bilateral and multilateral trade agreements is a variable that stratifies the sample. We may expect that bilateral trade agreements are concluded more quickly.
WTO membership: Becoming a member of the WTO signals to investors and foreign policy makers that the regulatory framework (and government intervention) is, in parts, bound by the WTO guidelines and it offers the opportunity to lock-in reforms aimed at liberalization. Sebenius (1983) .
15 See Hoekman and Roy (2000) and Francois (1997) .
16 See Mansfield and Milner (2012: 4; 89) . demands significant steps toward trade liberalization. An additional reduction of trade barriers is, consequentially then more difficult to negotiate over.
EU membership:
In addition to the factors outlined so far, I include a dummy variable in the regression analysis for membership of the EU in the negotiation and ratification processes.
This is due to its special role in the multilateral trading system, which includes the coordination of additional trade initiatives at the multilateral level with all EU member countries, as well as WTO-X provisions to be discussed in the negotiation stage, which may prolong the process.
17

Economic determinants
The decision of countries to form an FTA may also reveal information on the pace of implementation. This assumption is guided by the studies of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) as well as Magee (2003) Organisation, but they are mostly unenforceable -if not entirely devoid of substance. The Union, in other words, seems to be using trade agreements to promote its views on how countries of the world should be run, and it is able to enlist its trade partners to do this, albeit in a noncommittal or semi-committal way." duration-decreasing relationship with respect to higher tariff barriers may be interpreted as effective, but long-lasting negotiations, that lead to lower tariffs by the agreements' implementation date. In the 2007 World Trade Report (WTO, 2007: xxvi) , it is stated that "[…] lengthy negotiations may be a sign of the system at work -not at fault."
Level of trade openness:
The level of trade openness (measured as the ratio of exports in a countries' GDP) of a country reveals its dependence on the international exchange of goods.
With reference to the costs of non-cooperation, as mention in Fearon (1998) , any period foregone without trade liberalization refers to potential losses in firm revenue or any other benefit generated via an FTA. Countries with a higher exports-to-GDP ratio are, consequently, more likely to proceed more quickly through the implementation process.
Therefore, the expected effect in the duration analysis is negative. 18 On the other hand, FTAs are a long-term commitment. Therefore, investment and potential delay in the negotiation process should be taken into account as the costs of hasty compliance increase the longer the tariff concessions will remain in force.
Level of economic development: Trade theory based on the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model
tells us that countries specialize in goods, depending on the respective factor endowment (commonly capital and labor). Baier and Bergstrand (2004) employ the capital-labor ratio to estimate its effect on the probability of FTA formation. Their findings suggest that the higher the difference in the relative factor endowment, the more likely the formation of common trade agreement. The difference in per capita income levels is used as an indicator of the respective levels of economic development which approximates relative factor endowment. 19 Negotiation durations may differ for country-pairs at different levels of economic development as they negotiate over a different set of trade restrictions customized to their respective trade basket. Additionally, the product of the country-pairs'
18 Mansfield and Milner (2012) find that the level of trade openness is positively related to the probability of FTA formation. 19 The relationship between the per-capita income level and the capital-labor ratio can be derived from the percapita production function = .
level of economic development will be controlled for, in order to capture available capacities for trade negotiations.
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Cultural and Geographic determinants
Other variables that potentially interact with the countries' ability to smoothly cooperate and negotiate can be found in the cultural and geographic dimension. Common cultural peculiarities or customs may point toward a common history that, in most cases, involves routine in negotiation between both states.
Common language: This argumentation is akin to the motivation of the language variable in gravity estimations. Frankel (1997) argues that speaking a common language reduces the costs of doing business with the foreign country. Higher costs of doing business, due to a language barrier, imply higher costs for trade negotiations. We can expect the respective variable to have a negative effect on the duration (decrease the time until implementation).
Common border: In order to further control for standard gravity variables, I include a dummy that indicates contiguity. In gravity estimates, this variable has a positive effect on the bilateral trade volume due to lower transport costs. In the context presented here, I expect the contiguity variable to have a negative (shortening) effect as the frequency of political and economic interactions increases with countries that share a common border.
Nevertheless, in some instances contiguity may indicate a higher probability of conflict, which would correlate with troubled interactions at the policy level and hence lengthen the duration until successful implementation.
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Bilateral distance: Similar to the dummy variable on contiguity, bilateral distances are included to refer to the geographical proximity among a country-pair. The predictions with respect to the effect on the negotiation and ratification are therefore ambiguous as well. 20 Anecdotal evidence for the relevance of capacity in trade negations for the successful conclusion of FTAs is provided by the example of the Canada-CARICOM negotiations. Canada provided 2. (WITS, 2012) . The data on bilateral import tariffs between any two economies was found in the UNCTAD TRAINS database (UNCTAD, 2012) . This variable is defined as the average level of import tariffs on total imports. 25 In order to incorporate the nature of the democracy level in the analysis, I included data from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2012) . The project's polity2 variable reflects information on a country's democracy level (or autocracy level respectively). It ranges from -10 (autocracy) to +10 (democracy). Any number in between reflects democratic deficiencies. 26 For the level of political constraints within a country, I make use of the POLCONIII index by Henisz (2010) .
Data on the membership in the WTO was obtained from the WTO website. 27 The level of experience in implementing FTAs is measured as the number of implemented trade agreements in any given period. To control for geographic and historic characteristics, information on distance, contiguity and common languages are included. These variables take into account geographic and cultural proximity and were sourced from CEPII (2012).
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Note that there is reason for careful treatment of the level of democratization and the political constraints in the empirical analysis, as both measures are correlated. The polity2 index is partially constructed using the level of constraints at the executive level. In order to take this interaction into account in the empirical section, I estimate the respective models for each of the two variables separately and jointly.
Stylized facts
The 123 enacted trade agreements studied here took between 316 and 4,144 days from the start of negotiation through implementation, averaging 3.58 years (1,310 days [ Table 1 about here]
Alternative durations are also taken into account in the regression analysis. Table 1 
Empirics
This section motivates the econometric specification for the duration analysis. Central to this analysis is the survivor function, S(t), which describes the probability of "survival" beyond period t. "Survival" in the context presented here refers to either not concluding the 30 These two extremes potentially overstate the relation between the number of rounds and duration of the negotiation stage, as the pairwise correlation only amounts to 0.38.
31 Several other motives may have contributed to the understanding of the growth in bilateral and multilateral FTAs. Baldwin's (1993) domino theory, for example, shows how the costs of non-participation in an FTA increase the more that trading partners form common agreements.
negotiation or not ratifying the FTA. The mirror image of the survivor function, F(t), describes the cumulative probability that negotiations or ratifications have been concluded prior to period t. It follows that: Figure 2 depicts the survival graph for the trade initiatives with the example of duration between the start of negotiations and implementation. It describes the probability (y-axis) of an FTA's process duration to be longer than t days (on the x-axis). In this figure, the data used are not censored because the start date always refers to the announcement of the start of negotiations and end with the implementation of the respective FTA.
[ Figure 2 about here]
A number of econometric specifications are available for the analysis of duration data. The popular semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards (PH) model does not specify any distribution for the conditional hazard rate (conditional probability of exit), in contrast to the parametric specifications that I focus on later. 32 The model being unconstraint from any distributional form is its biggest advantage because it is sometimes cumbersome to determine whether the hazard is constant (in which case an exponential distribution is implied) or monotonically increasing or decreasing, which would demand the Weibull distribution. The Cox model implies the PH assumption:
In general, this formula states that the ratio of the hazards of individuals i and j (and respective time-varying characteristics ( ) and ( ) ) is constant and therefore independent of t. In the context presented here, this assumption implies that, given a treatment (e.g. bilateral compared to multilateral FTA), the ratio of the conditional 32 The Cox proportional hazards model is considered semi-parametric because the covariates enter the regression in a linear fashion, but no assumption is made for the baseline hazard.
probability of implementation in any period is constant. Graphically, this translates into parallel hazard rates.
In contrast to the Cox model, parametric models, such as the exponential, Weibull or loglogistic model, assume a distribution for the baseline hazard. The correct model can be obtained by estimating the gamma model that puts the fewest assumptions on the underlying distribution and then perform tests on the respective parameter estimates that come out of the regression.
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A method that does not rely on the PH assumption is the accelerated failure time (AFT) model. It focuses on the survival function and therefore allows a direct interpretation for the effect of the coefficients on the survival time. The AFT model carries the name "accelerated" because we are no longer bound to the PH assumption. Instead changes in the covariates may now increase or decrease the probability of failure along the durations (Orbe et al., 2002) . Key to understanding the difference between the AFT and the PH models is that the coefficients of the AFT model measure elasticities (given that the covariates are also measured in logs). The survival graphs of two distinct characteristics may then be shifted non-proportionally and reveal increasing or decreasing distances (differences in probabilities) between them. In our context, this may imply that the effect of having a bilateral instead of a multilateral FTA increases or decreases according to the value on the x-
axis (T). Figure 3 depicts this example:
The survival function is plotted according to the type (bilateral/multilateral) of any given trade agreement. Two noticeable observations need further attention. First, the probability of observing no successful implementation beyond t is higher for trade agreements with more than two trading partners. Let us consider the probability for not observing implementation prior to day 1,000: if the FTA is bilateral, this probability is just above 50%, whereas for multilateral initiatives the respective figure is set around 75%. This lends support to the hypothesis that as more countries are involved in the 33 The gamma distribution nests the Weibull as well as the exponential model depending on the parameter values of the baseline hazard. The exponential model e.g. demands a conditional probability of implementation that is constant over time; an assumption that is violated by my data. The difference between the log-logistic and the Weibull model is that the former allows for a non-monotonically increasing or decreasing hazard, compared to the latter model which assumes monotonic hazards. See Cleves et al. (2008: 270) for the respective approach.
negotiation of an agreement, the longer it will take to close the negotiations. Second, the two curves in the survival graph do not tend to support the PH assumption, as they cross for very short and long durations.
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[ Figure 3 about here]
The results of the log-logistic model, similar to the empirical analysis of the duration of the ratification phase in Mansfield and Milner (2012) , are discussed in the following section.
From the diagnostic tests performed, I can assume that either the Weibull or the log-logistic model in AFT form best matches the demand of the data, due to duration-dependent survival probabilities. Estimation of the parametric gamma model provides information that the Weibull model may be a candidate for the parametric approach. 35 However, due to convergence issues in the computation of the regressions in section 6, I opt for the estimation using the log-logistic distribution instead of the Weibull. The log-logistic distribution is easily modified to cope with time-varying covariates. 36, 37 This is particularly important as the dataset is constructed to allow for changes in the income or democracy levels for example. Note that a misspecification of the estimated model in terms of the distributional assumptions may severely bias the results, since the assumption of a monotonic hazard in the presence of a non-monotonic hazard may lead to the confirmation of unobserved heterogeneity. The decreasing hazard for higher time-observations will then be based on frailty of the individuals (in our context: country-pairs).
For the estimation, I make use of country-pair data that allows for taking into account a much wider range of information than alternative methods. Any country in the prospective FTA has the potential to prolong the implementation based on any other participant 34 Numerically, a violation of the PH assumption was checked globally and confirmed (using Stata's estat phtest command). See Figure A1 in the Appendix for a test of the PH assumption based on Schoenfeld residuals. 35 More precisely, the kappa value in the regressions based on the gamma distribution is estimated to be significantly different from zero while ln_sigma is significantly different from 1.
36 See Wooldridge (2002) and Bergstrand et al. (2010) for the duration analysis of the formation of FTAs using the log-logistic distribution. 37 The Weibull model does not allow frailty or shared frailty estimations to be computed without reflecting problems in convergence, even if gamma frailty is replaced by inverse Gaussian.
country. An alternative would be to make use of FTA specific information gathered from individual country data. This proves to be cumbersome in the regression analysis as measures of dispersion (average difference in per-capita GDPs, variation in trade openness etc.) do not sufficiently capture the available information. 38 Therefore, I opt for the dyadic approach, following Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Bergstrand et al. (2010) . The latter also uses country-pair data for the FTA specific dependent variable in the analysis on the duration until the implementation of a trade agreement. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) make use of a dyadic dataset as any country may be able to veto the implementation and thereby exercise the power to halt the initiative.
A dataset with time-varying covariates is employed to fully incorporate the time-varying information involved in the majority of explanatory variables. This allows for a better evaluation of the effects of economic and political determinants because the duration from negotiation to implementation easily exceeds three years. An analysis based on timeconstant covariates (e.g. fixed at the date of the start of negotiations) would neglect a significant amount of information.
I try to control for unobserved heterogeneity via the shared frailty model. In addition to a given set of included covariates, the frailty model includes a multiplicative term in the hazard function. It is thereby similar to a random effects model which also controls for unobserved heterogeneity, given that the unobserved factor is uncorrelated with the included regressors. 39 If we assume that all country-pairs are homogeneous conditional on all the regressors included in the model, the hazard function may be correctly specified using some distribution. If, however, some individuals are frailer than others, the hazard function may underestimate the degree of positive duration dependence. I assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is common at the FTA level, meaning that unobserved effects on the negotiation and ratification duration are common for all potential FTA members. The distribution of the error term in AFT models is adjusted to fit the nature of the duration data.
Note that some of the variables in the following regression analysis are transformed into 38 It is problematic to decide on how to include and aggregate variables like common language.
39 Alternatively, one could implement a fixed-effects model that controls for the shared frailty factor in the regression.
logs, such that the interpretation of the coefficients differs, compared to non-transformed covariates.
One additional potential source of bias is sample selection. This would be problematic if observations based on the dependent variable are chosen, which cannot be ruled out as only
FTAs that have been implemented are considered in addition to those which are still in their negotiation or ratification stages ("early announcements"). We consequently do not observe failed implementations. Furthermore, it could be the case that treatment is based on unobservables that could also influence the outcome variable. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, the shared frailty parameter (at the FTA level) is included in the regression analysis, among other variables that have shown to influence the decision to form an FTA. 
Results
This section makes use of four different durations (dependent variables), each analyzed with three different specifications, taking into account the interplay between the level of democratization and the political constraints: the first regressions (Table 2) summarize the results of estimations based on the parametric log-logistic frailty model in AFT form for the time between the start of the negotiation until its end. Table 3 plots the results on the ratification period, from the signature of the agreement until its implementation. In Table 4 , both periods are subsumed to represent the duration from the negotiation start until the enforcement of provisions. In Table A1 in the Appendix, you can find additional estimates for which the starting point of the duration is the first official proposal to form an agreement.
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40 Nevertheless, be advised that the major share of information for the negotiation and proposed events is sourced from newspaper articles and news releases available either in English or German. The resulting (potential) source of endogeneity is ignored, even though negotiation and ratification durations of FTAs, for which news was available in English or German may be different from those in other languages. 41 As data on the proposal of an agreement is the least reliable, the respective results should be considered accordingly. Note that the absolute number of observations is the highest for the estimates based on the proposal as the starting point, as I make use of a dataset with time-varying variables. The total time span from proposal to the implementation is the longest (in years) for the duration.
[ [ Table 3 about here]
If we switch to the ratification stage (Table 3) with caution. Different signs and significance levels may well arise through a different set of country-pairs and FTAs. Nevertheless, the respective coefficients for the political constraints and democracy variables suggest that an increase by one unit in the sum of the index denoting the democracy level is associated with a delay of 14%. Similarly, doubling the value of the political constraints index reflects a slower implementation by around 39%. restrictions among the country-pairs, another finding supports the assertion from section three that once I take the implementation date into account, lower import tariffs may be the result of more thorough, yet longer, negotiation and ratification periods triggering the decrease in import barriers. As I argue below, when it comes to the period between the start of the negotiations and the agreements' implementation, less ambitious approaches during negotiation (associated with shorter durations) may well lead to missing out on free trade
[ Table 4 about here]
By combining the negotiation and ratification periods (Table 4) , increased trade openness again indicates a shorter time period from the start of the negotiation process until the final implementation of the trade agreement. Similarly, WTO member states show a significantly shorter time until the agreements are implemented, even if both measures from the political spectrum are controlled for. Interestingly, and in line with the theoretical predictions, the coefficient for the level of economic development now becomes significantly negative, pointing toward a faster process for higher income country-pairs. This effect seems to be driven by the ratification stage (Table 3) , whose results also pointed in this direction. Other determinants that only change marginally in their magnitude (vis-à-vis the ratification stage) 43 Note that the index for political constraints is measured in logs whereas the polity2 index is not.
and with respect to the sign are the EU member and political variables, even though the coefficient for the sum of the polity2 index decreases considerably and even becomes insignificant, mirroring the fact that the effect on the ratification duration is diluted by the negotiation period. Unaltered is the message conveyed by the level of trade barriers: Higher import tariffs for goods traded among country-pairs are associated with shorter negotiation and ratification periods. Note that this effect may be due to reversed causality. As I make use of time-varying covariates (including import tariffs), a longer negotiation period may well be associated with higher initial import tariffs that, by the end of the implementation, are lowered considerably due to the negotiations. This implies that, once I take the implementation period into account, higher trade barriers can be a consequence of hasty trade negotiations. That claim is also supported by Table A1 , which takes the first official proposal of an FTA as the starting point of the duration into account.
Conclusion
Trade agreements are characterized by their heterogeneity in a number of dimensions: from the coverage of goods, their effect on the bilateral trade volume, to the duration of the negotiation and ratification processes. Against the background of transition processes of firms in anticipation of a trade agreement, this paper focuses on the duration from initial announcement to implementation of FTAs. I make use of a dataset with time-varying covariates that covers officially notified FTAs for which the dates on the proposal, the start/end of negotiations, the signing and the implementation are available.
From the information on the available agreements, there is supportive evidence that both economic and political determinants matter for the duration of the negotiation process.
After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the regression analysis, I find that bilateral agreements reflect shorter negotiation processes. This finding is consistent with Moser and Rose (2012) as well as Simonelli (2011) . The complexity of the agreements' design seems to increase with the number of potential trading partners at the bargaining table. When it comes to anticipatory trade effects via FTAs, this result also relates to the findings of Mölders and Volz (2011) , who claim that the negotiation stage of bilateral trade agreements already reflects positive trade-creating effects. This may be due to the (anticipated) faster negotiation process of bilateral FTAs.
The effect of the country-pairs' democratization and political constraints levels on the ratification duration points toward a prolonging effect, which partly supports the finding of Haftel and Thompson (forthcoming) , who claim that a higher level of checks and balances (prevalent in more democratic countries) significantly prolongs the respective durations for bilateral investment treaties. In a similar vein, Mansfield and Milner (2012) show that more veto players are associated with a delay in ratification in the case of FTAs. This result is confirmed by my data. The findings further suggest that more democratic states are more likely to finish trade negotiations faster, which is in line with the claim that these types of countries cooperate more easily. Therefore, regime types seem to matter for the processing of trade agreements.
The results associated with the effect of higher import tariffs are surprising at first sight, but point toward a need for lengthy implementation periods for high tariff cuts. This is in line with the assertion that negotiation partners are working longer in order to arrive at lower trade barriers. 44 I further observe that trade openness is associated with shorter ratification periods. Similarly, the effect for WTO members and more active FTA countries also indicates significantly shorter processes for the same duration. It could be the case that better capacities and more experience in implementing FTAs can be the driving factor behind this result.
Consistent with the prediction outlined in section three, once the EU is involved, negotiations as well as ratifications reveal a significantly longer negotiation period, Notes: x-axis denotes duration time in days; y-axis denotes the probability of implementation after day t; stratified by FTA type: BTA=1 if bilateral agreement, BTA=0 otherwise. Notes: "Negotiation: start-end" refers to the duration from the start of negotiations until the end; "Negotiation-Signing" refers to the duration from the start of negotiations until the FTA is signed; "Negotiation-Implementation" refers to the duration from the start of negotiations until the FTA is implemented; "Signing-Implementation" refers to the duration from the signing of the FTA until the FTA is implemented; "Proposal-Implementation" refers to the duration from the first official proposal to form an FTA until the agreement is implemented; own calculations. Notes: "FTA activity" denotes the sum of a country-pairs' enforced agreements in any respective period; "Trade openness" is defined as the product of a country-pairs' exports/GDP; "BTA" denotes bilateral trade agreements; "WTO members" refers to a country-pair as being mutual members of the WTO; "Distance" denotes the bilateral great-circle distance between countries; "Border" refers to contiguity; "Language" denotes a common official language; "GDP-per cap." is calculated as the product of the per-capita income levels (in Logs); "GDP-per cap. (diff.)" is calculated as the difference in per-capita income levels (in Logs); "Democracy (sum)" and "Democracy (difference)" refer to the respective sum and difference in the polity2 index; "PolConstr. (sum)" and "PolConstr. (difference)" refer to the respective sum and difference in the Political Constraints index. "Avg. Tariff Level" denotes the average effectively applied import tariff between any country-pair in the FTA; "EU" signals that at a member country of the European Union is involved in the process. "FTAs" denotes the number FTAs in the regression for which data on the respective events were available. Note that the number of observations (countrypairs) and FTAs does not necessarily have to be proportional, as the data for the explanatory variables may be available for fewer FTAs (e.g. the political constraints index is only available until 2007) but at the same time for those which have the most observations, either via the number of country-pairs or the number of years for the duration. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses Notes: "FTA activity" denotes the sum of a country-pairs' enforced agreements in any respective period; "Trade openness" is defined as the product of a country-pairs' exports/GDP; "BTA" denotes bilateral trade agreements; "WTO members" refers to a country-pair as being mutual members of the WTO; "Distance" denotes the bilateral great-circle distance between countries; "Border" refers to contiguity; "Language" denotes a common official language; "GDP-per cap." is calculated as the product of the per-capita income levels (in Logs); "GDP-per cap. (diff.)" is calculated as the difference in per-capita income levels (in Logs); "Democracy (sum)" and "Democracy (difference)" refer to the respective sum and difference in the polity2 index; "PolConstr. (sum)" and "PolConstr. (difference)" refer to the respective sum and difference in the Political Constraints index. "Avg. Tariff Level" denotes the average effectively applied import tariff between any country-pair in the FTA; "EU" signals that at a member country of the European Union is involved in the process. "FTAs" denotes the number FTAs in the regression for which data on the respective events were available. Note that the number of observations (countrypairs) and FTAs does not necessarily have to be proportional, as the data for the explanatory variables may be available for fewer FTAs (e.g. the political constraints index is only available until 2007) but at the same time for those which have the most observations, either via the number of country-pairs or the number of years for the duration. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses Notes: "FTA activity" denotes the sum of a country-pairs' enforced agreements in any respective period; "Trade openness" is defined as the product of a country-pairs' exports/GDP; "BTA" denotes bilateral trade agreements; "WTO members" refers to a country-pair as being mutual members of the WTO; "Distance" denotes the bilateral great-circle distance between countries; "Border" refers to contiguity; "Language" denotes a common official language; "GDP-per cap." is calculated as the product of the per-capita income levels (in Logs); "GDP-per cap. (diff.)" is calculated as the difference in per-capita income levels (in Logs); "Democracy (sum)" and "Democracy (difference)" refer to the respective sum and difference in the polity2 index; "PolConstr. (sum)" and "PolConstr. (difference)" refer to the respective sum and difference in the Political Constraints index. "Avg. Tariff Level" denotes the average effectively applied import tariff between any country-pair in the FTA; "EU" signals that at a member country of the European Union is involved in the process. "FTAs" denotes the number FTAs in the regression for which data on the respective events were available. Note that the number of observations (countrypairs) and FTAs does not necessarily have to be proportional, as the data for the explanatory variables may be available for fewer FTAs (e.g. the political constraints index is only available until 2007) but at the same time for those which have the most observations, either via the number of country-pairs or the number of years for the duration. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses Notes: "FTA activity" denotes the sum of a country-pairs' enforced agreements in any respective period; "Trade openness" is defined as the product of a country-pairs' exports/GDP; "BTA" denotes bilateral trade agreements; "WTO members" refers to a country-pair as being mutual members of the WTO; "Distance" denotes the bilateral great-circle distance between countries; "Border" refers to contiguity; "Language" denotes a common official language; "GDP-per cap." is calculated as the product of the per-capita income levels (in Logs); "GDP-per cap. (diff.)" is calculated as the difference in per-capita income levels (in Logs); "Democracy (sum)" and "Democracy (difference)" refer to the respective sum and difference in the polity2 index; "PolConstr. (sum)" and "PolConstr. (difference)" refer to the respective sum and difference in the Political Constraints index. "Avg. Tariff Level" denotes the average effectively applied import tariff between any country-pair in the FTA; "EU" signals that at a member country of the European Union is involved in the process. "FTAs" denotes the number FTAs in the regression for which data on the respective events were available. Note that the number of observations (countrypairs) and FTAs does not necessarily have to be proportional, as the data for the explanatory variables may be available for fewer FTAs (e.g. the political constraints index is only available until 2007) but at the same time for those which have the most observations, either via the number of country-pairs or the number of years for the duration. * p < 0. 
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